

PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE



PROJECT DOCUMENT

Length : Max. 12 pages (plus cover page + annexes)

Country: NIGERIA			
Project Title: Integrated Approach to Building Peace in Nigeria's Farmer-Herder Crisis (working title)			
Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway:			
PBF project modality:		If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IRF	<input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund		
<input type="checkbox"/> PRF	<input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund		
Name of Recipient Fund:			
Expected project commencement date¹: 1 January 2019			
Project duration in months:² 18 months			
Total PBF project budget* (by recipient organization starting with Lead): \$3,000,000			
UNDP: \$1,683,283.41			
UN Women: \$321,058.85			
FAO: \$692,890.54			
OHCHR: \$302,767.20			
<i>*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account</i>			
Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):			
PBF 1st tranche:	PBF 2nd tranche*:	PBF 3rd tranche*:	__ tranche
UNDP: \$1,178,298.39	UNDP: \$504,985.02	N/A	N/A
UN Women: \$ 321,058.85	UN Women:		
FAO: \$485,023.38	FAO: \$207,867.16		
OHCHR: \$302,767.20	OHCHR:		
One sentence of project description:			
This project supports Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba states in addressing the farmer-herder crisis through enhancing their preventive capacities by promoting dialogue and proactive engagement; building mutually beneficial economic relationships between farmers and herders; improving the effectiveness of the security response through strengthened human rights monitoring and accountability; and providing an impartial and evidence-based narrative to defuse the politicized debate and help mobilize a broader response.			
Summarize the in-country project consultation and endorsement process prior to submission to PBSO, including through any PBF Steering Committee where it exists:			

¹ Note: actual commencement date will be the date of first funds transfer.

² Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

Multiple missions to the affected states have built the groundwork for conceptualizing this project. In addition, it builds off experiences and expertise amongst the four UN agencies involved in doing similar work in other areas in Nigeria and beyond. Prior to submission of this first draft, the four agencies have engaged the liaison officers and focal points of all three states, as well as the Ministry for Budget and National Planning.

Project Gender Marker Score: 2

- **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective (minimum of 80% of total budget going to gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE))
- **Score 2** for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective (minimum of 30% of the total budget going to GEWE)
- **Score 1** for projects that will contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 15% of the total budget going to GEWE)

Specify % and \$ of total project budget allocated to activities in direct pursuit of gender equality and women’s empowerment: \$928,596.50 is allocated towards gender equality and women’s empowerment, which constitutes 32.9% of the programmed costs under this budget.

Project risk marker score: 2

0 = low risk to achieving outcomes

1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes

2 = high risk to achieving outcomes

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project (*select ONLY one*): 2.3

Conflict prevention/management

Type of submission:

New project

Project amendment

If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:

Extension of duration:

Change of project outcome/ scope:









Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:

Additional PBF budget:

Brief justification:

Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New signatures are required.

PROJECT SIGNATURES:

<p>Recipient Organization³</p> <p> Samuel Bwalya</p> <p>Country Director in Nigeria United Nations Development Programme</p> <p>Date: 27/11/2018</p> <p>Seal:</p>	<p>Recipient Organization</p> <p> Comfort Lamptey</p> <p>Country Representative in Nigeria UN Women</p> <p>Date:</p> <p>Seal:</p>
<p>Recipient Organization</p> <p> Suffyan Koroma</p> <p>Country Representative in Nigeria Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</p> <p>Date:</p> <p>Seal:</p>	<p>Recipient Organization</p> <p> Kyle Ward</p> <p>Programme Support and Management Services Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</p> <p>Date: 30/11/2018</p> <p>Seal: </p>
<p>Representative of National Authorities</p> <p> Olajide Odewale</p> <p>Permanent Secretary Federal Ministry for Budget and National Planning</p> <p>Date:</p> <p>Seal:</p>	<p>Head of UN Country Team</p> <p> Edward Kallon</p> <p>Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator United Nations System in Nigeria</p> <p>Date: 27/11/2018</p> <p>Seal:</p>
<p>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</p> <p> Oscar Fernandez-Taranco</p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General Peacebuilding Support Office</p> <p>Date:</p> <p>Seal:</p>	

³ Please include signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.

I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

- a) A brief summary of **conflict analysis findings** as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age- sensitive.

Nigeria has undergone significant internal conflicts and violence with considerable impact on the sustainability of its development, the consolidation of democracy, and the corporate existence of the country as a federation. Prolonged military rule for 30 out of the 57 years of independence has had a considerable effect on the democratic culture, significantly undermining constitutional federalism as a result of the over-centralization of power and resources, violating the rights of citizens, weakening of the rule of law, and enthroneing a culture of arbitrariness and impunity.

Nigeria's multiple and diverse ethnic, regional, and religious character is thus a key defining context of its democratic governance as well as its conflict dynamics. There are three broad typologies of conflict in Nigeria based on the underlying factors:

- Conflicts and violence driven by political dynamics such as elections and the struggle for power at both national, state and local levels (power-based conflicts).
- The various forms of communal conflicts, which have resulted from the politicization of ethnic and religious identities and those that are fueled by the distinction between formal citizenship of the Nigerian state and indigeneity (identity-based conflicts).
- Conflicts fueled by competition for resources such as land for both farming and grazing purposes, and the control of natural resources such as oil wealth as in the Niger Delta region (resource-based conflicts).

The Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria, carried out by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in 2016, identified the conflict between herders and farmers in Nigeria as the single most widely spread peace and security threat in the country. The highest number of reported conflicts of this nature between herdsmen and local farmers occur in the "Middle Belt" and adjacent states, particularly the states of Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba and Adamawa⁴. Thousands of lives have been lost, property destroyed, and communities left in disarray, with many more internally displaced all over many parts of the Middle Belt and other parts of Nigeria. Estimates indicate that the communal violence between farmers and herders claimed more lives in 2016 alone than the Boko Haram insurgency⁵ and International Crisis Group suggests that the recent escalation of the crisis from early 2018 has claimed six times the number of lives to that of the Boko Haram insurgency in the same period.⁶

More men, especially male youth, than women may have been killed on both sides of the conflict during clashes in the affected states, because of their direct involvement in the fighting. However, women and girls are the population worst affected by the physical violence and the psychological effect during and in the aftermath of these violent clashes. For instance, rape

⁴ International Crisis Group, "Herders Against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict" Africa Report No. 252, 19 September 2017.

⁵ SBM Intel (2017): *A Look at Nigeria's Security Situation*, http://sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/201701_Security-report.pdf.

⁶ International Crisis Group (2018): "Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence" Africa Report No. 262, 26 July 2018.

and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls are reportedly used by young men on both sides of the conflict divide as tactics to humiliate men on the opposite side of the conflict. Women from the affected communities report being forcibly taken from their homes and raped during the clashes, and while fleeing their communities. Women and children also constitute the largest proportion of the population displaced by conflict. A rapid assessment in February 2018, indicated that about 80 percent of the households in some of the displaced camps were women-headed with half of the entire women IDP population not engaged in any form of productive livelihood activities. Women also mentioned several threats they faced including sexual harassment and abuse, and negative coping practices they are adapting to make ends meet, including transactional sex and families marrying off young girls. About 87 per cent of the women sampled reported experiencing physical violence. Approximately 37 per cent reported having experienced sexual violence, 25 per cent emotional violence and another 37 per cent have been forced into early marriage as a result of the displacement.

Also, the disruption of access to land and loss of cattle, and their economic, social, political and cultural wealth have impacted both men and women in the farmer and herder societies respectively, but in distinct ways. The loss of land and cattle, traditional symbols of wealth for men among the farmer and herder societies respectively have sometimes correlated to an increase in domestic violence against women and girls who take on the care burden of the family. For women, the impact is further magnified as relatives of men killed in the clashes often evict widows from their land (in the farmer communities) or dispossess them of any cattle left by the deceased husband (in herder communities).

Several studies⁷ point to young men as one of the main perpetrators of intergroup violence, implicating them in the harassment of rival groups (herders or farmers). While their participation in such acts is frequently attributed to acting in self-defense or retaliation, others have credited the recent trend of youth involvement in the violent clashes in the states of Benue, Plateau, and Kaduna to the widespread and deepening poverty, and rising unemployment among a large and growing youth population. According to a USAID assessment report from August 2014, for instance, Benue youths from farming and pastoral communities colluded to steal and slaughter cattle, which triggered wider conflict between the two groups. The assessment also implicated women to have participated, and at times encouraged men to participate in violence to protect their community.

Besides the impact on human lives, the huge security implications are draining Nigeria's economy of resources meant for development and undermining food security in the country and the sub-region. According to reports published in July 2015 by Mercy Corps, Benue, Plateau, Kaduna and Nasarawa states could gain up to \$13.7 billion annually in total macroeconomic benefits if the conflict between herdsman and farmers was fully addressed. The economic and peace dividends beyond the concerned states are enormous. Mercy Corps estimated that Nigerian households affected by the ongoing clashes could witness an increase in their income ranging between 64 and 210 percent if these conflicts were resolved.

Although conflicts between nomadic herdsman and sedentary farmers is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, there has been an escalation both in the frequency and intensity of the conflicts over the last decade, and particularly in 2018. Herdsman, who are predominantly of the Fulani ethnic group, have been grazing their cattle in the Northern part (and many other parts of the country) of Nigeria for decades. The Benue River that transects the Middle Belt states has long been one of the traditional watering and pasture stops for herdsman in their seasonal migration. However, due to a combination of factors, large numbers of pastoralists started shifting towards the south into the country's Middle Belt dominated by several

⁷ Ajibefun, M.B., Journal of Educational and Social Research, Volume Number 2, May 2018

Animist/Christian ethnic groups of sedentary agriculturalists. The southward movement of herdsmen in search of grazing land has resulted in increasing numbers of clashes with farming communities who accuse the herdsmen of deliberately grazing cattle on farmlands causing crop destruction.

The International Crisis Group⁸ attributes this southward movement and associated increased conflict to drought and desertification affecting the greater part of Northern Nigeria, loss of grazing reserves initially established by the Northern States in the 1960s for transhumance, changes in pastoral and farming practices, cattle rustling and banditry in the northern border rural areas, the escalating conflict in Northern Nigeria (Boko Haram insurgency), the proliferation of small arms in the region, and the erosion of traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution.

The narratives arising out of clashes over farmland and/or pasture, have increasingly taken religious undertones (Muslims versus Christians), with religious leaders publicly exchanging accusations, as well as ethnic connotations (indigenes versus settlers) and stereotypes that have heightened tensions, a development which has further polarized communities and complicated efforts at mitigating the violence. The conflicts have already been highly politicized, with some groups proclaiming the southward movement of pastoralists as a deliberate political attempt to 'Islamize' southern Nigeria. Media coverage of incidents often sensationalizes the violence and contributes to spreading divisive narratives. Communities in states affected by farmer-herder conflicts have revealed a widespread distrust of security forces who are often perceived by both farmers and herders to be biased and ineffective when responding to incidents. This results in poor coordination and information sharing between local communities, civil society groups and security agencies on the one hand, hindering early warning and rapid response and a rise in local militias or vigilante groups to plug the gap.⁹

The multi-dimensional effects of the crises have overwhelmed state and federal authorities, whom many perceive not to be doing enough to address the crisis. The lack of an effective early response by security agencies as well as perceived injustices, partiality, and ineffectiveness, is eroding public trust in the state's ability to protect its citizens. With states lacking effective tools to address the crisis at the state level, many state governments have turned to the federal government in search for support, most notably through requesting a strengthened security response. The lack of such a response has given way to tension between the federal and state level. The inability of security forces and local authorities to constructively respond to incidents, as well as the lack of trust in the Government to address tensions, often results in reprisal attacks and escalates the conflicts further.¹⁰

Conflict actor analysis

Sedentary agricultural population

The sedentary agriculturalists inhabiting the Middle Belt of Nigeria come from a variety of smaller, predominantly Christian, tribes. The region is densely populated with a large number

⁸ International Crisis Group, "Herders Against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict" Africa Report No. 252, 19 September 2017.

⁹ Women, Peace and Security Architecture in Northern Nigeria: A Review of Peace and Security Architecture in Adamawa, Gombe and Plateau State: A Report prepared for UN Women project on promoting women's Engagement in peace & security in northern NIGERIA by Hussaini Abdu.

¹⁰ Ibid.

of scattered rural settlements, maximizing land use for the cultivation of grains such as maize, cash crops such as sesame, vegetables, fruit trees, groundnuts and rice in wetland areas such as along the Benue River. Both men and women farm. The region is considered the “bread basket” of Nigeria.

Farmers are cultivating new land without considering existing cattle routes, turning most grazing areas and cattle routes into farm lands to meet increased demand from population growth and urbanization. Farmers are not willing to stop expansion of farmland or provide passage routes for cattle. As a result of the expansion of farmlands, grazing lands have become scarce.

Damage to crops as a result of the grazing activities of pastoralists, and the blocking of grazing routes as a result of expansion of farmlands, is one of the main drivers of conflict between farmers and pastoralists, as well as destruction of water points by pastoralists. The level of crop destruction has increased in many of the Middle Belt areas over the past decade. Crop destruction predominantly negatively affects farmers, impacting on their food security and economic livelihoods. There is a direct relationship between the prevalence of crop destruction and the level of violence in a community.

Mobile pastoralist population

Livestock represents between 20 and 30 per cent of total agricultural production in Nigeria, and about 6 to 8 per cent of overall GDP. Pastoralists own approximately 90 per cent of the national herd (estimated at 19.5 million cattle, 72.5 million goats, 41.3 million sheep, and >1 million beasts of burden). About 30 per cent of live animals slaughtered in Nigeria are brought in by pastoralists from other countries.

Over 90 per cent of pastoralists are Fulani, a large ethnic group straddling several West and Central African countries, predominantly Muslim. Fulani herdsman are generally perceived as people whose life, survival and tradition are embedded in the value attached to the herds, and the capacity they retain to protect their way of life through mobility in search of a better environment for their livestock.

For centuries, pastoralists drove their cattle east and west across the Sahel including Nigeria’s northern belt. In the early 20th century, some herders started shifting their migratory routes farther south, pushed by a series of droughts in the far north and loss of northern grazing reserves, but also attracted by heightened security in central and southern Nigeria and by better control of parasitic diseases in the central and southern zones. As cattle herds migrated southward, so did conflicts between pastoralists and farmers.

Pastoralists identify the blocking of cattle grazing routes and access to water points by farmers as a key source of conflict, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for the pastoralists to control their livestock while grazing, since most of the grazing routes are blocked by farmlands. Additionally, the number of pastoralists and cattle has also increased significantly over the years due to migration.

Federal and state authorities

The federal government has been widely criticized for being too slow to respond to the crisis. Nevertheless, a Committee was set up to consider a solution to the nationwide crisis between herders and farmers. Headed by the Vice President and made up of nine State Governors, this committee has put forward the National Livestock Transformation Plan with support from the United Nations (led by FAO) which puts in place a national framework for addressing the crisis, focusing on developing ranching, grazing reserves and fodder production. A Northern Governors meeting in Kaduna in March 2018 embraced ranching as a solution, saying it will solve the security challenges, increase the productivity of the cattle, and enable the herders to have uninterrupted access to education and healthcare. A Technical Sub-Committee set up by the National Economic Council Working Group has also recommended the adoption of ranching in some of the states affected by the ongoing herders-farmers clashes (Zamfara, Nasarawa, Adamawa, Taraba and Benue) as a sustainable solution to the conflict.

In a move to dispel the criticism and demonstrate the Federal Government's commitment to resolving the crisis, President Buhari undertook a visit to Benue, Plateau, Adamawa and Taraba states. On the back of these visits, the military has been deployed in the area to beef up security, with the aim of neutralizing the armed and criminal elements that are responsible for the rising insecurity. As at date, deployment of security forces into some affected states remains one of the few visible ways the Federal Government has concretely engaged in the crisis. However, engagement with state authorities yield that such deployment, where it comes, often comes too late and multiple requests for support from states to the Federal Government frequently fall on deaf ears.

As a result, states have initiated their own processes to address the crisis. Benue state passed the Open Grazing Prohibition and Establishment of Ranching Law in 2017, putting an end to open grazing in the state. The law went into effect on 1 November 2017 and created more tensions between farmers and pastoralists in the state. Taraba state passed a similar law, which was due to go into effect in January 2018, but following the events in neighboring Benue, the state decided to postpone the enforcement of the law while it continues to consult and raise awareness on its implications.

State authorities have generally treated crimes arising from farmer-herder clashes as political rather than criminal acts, arguing that sanctioning suspects could spark further violence. Even if commissions of inquiry are established, they typically are used as instruments to temper tensions rather than pursue justice. These responses, however well meaning, create a climate of impunity and continue to fuel the violence.

Traditional and religious leaders

Traditional and religious leaders are identified as conflict actors who play both positive and negative roles in resolving conflict between farmers and pastoralists at the community level. Traditional leaders tend to intervene whenever the conflict exceeds civilian task force/local peace committees' capacity to resolve. Traditional and religious leaders can play important roles in preventing the escalation of conflict by promoting a neutral narrative of anti-violence, counselling the youth against acts that will lead to outbreak of violence in the communities. However, among Christian communities, herder attacks are widely touted as a subtle form of *jihad*, with Christian Church leaders promoting a narrative of northern, Muslim occupation.

NGOs and special interest groups (cattle associations/farmers associations)

Non-governmental organizations generally have been more conciliatory in response to the violence. They have focused on post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding, improving early warning and strengthening relations between communities and security agencies. International partners such as USAID, British Council, UN Agencies and INGOs are encouraging herder-farmer dialogues through various local initiatives.

Despite these commendable efforts, many special interest groups have gained traction for their respective agendas. Ethnic and community-based groups defending farmers' interests typically have organized press conferences and protests, seeking to draw national and international attention to their plight. Some have instituted legal actions, while others have set up arrangements to monitor both herders, farmers and criminal elements. Livestock producers' groups and pastoralists' organizations, strenuously defend herders' interests and insist media reports of incidents are often politically motivated. Umbrella groups, such as Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association and the Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, also tend to downplay (or outright justify) herders' involvement in the violence.

In passing the Benue State law in 2017, the Movement Against Fulani Occupation (MAFO), which describes the current situation as a "Fulani occupation of Benue State" gained significant traction, even at the national level. However, the law was resisted by Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, who claimed that it demanded a change in centuries old culture and way of life of herdsman. The back and forth between highly partisan positions further poisoned an already vitriolic narrative, and implementation of the law has sparked further violence in the state. There have been a wide array of calls for the banning of Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore on the grounds that it supports violence.

Private sector

Key private sector stakeholder groups that represent the interests of various affected populations include wealthy cattle owners (often shadow actors/elites), farmers associations, local community market structures, commercial ranches, cattle breeders'/owners' associations, and financial institutions support capital investments into development of livestock and crops-to-market value chains. Many of them are aligned with special interest groups on one side of the conflict or the other, although the specific loyalties are oftentimes murky. In addressing the crisis, there is a need for a revitalization of the political economy of the food and livestock production sectors, whose financial interests are at stake should the crisis continue and escalate.

Security forces (Army/police)

The federally-controlled Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) are thinly deployed in rural areas and often lack early-warning mechanisms. Even when community and civil society groups get involved, both herders and farmers say the response to distress calls is often late and lacking. Herders have long claimed that any action against attackers who kill them and steal their cattle comes from a lack of trust and

accountability in security and justice institutions to hold persons to account. Farmers say the agencies' failure to respond promptly to distress calls and punish aggressors emboldens the herders. The more typical response has been to deploy the police, and sometimes the army, after clashes take place.

The police are often seen as negative conflict actors and contributors to conflict. This is because the police are seen as either biased in their conflict resolution approach, and/or easily corrupted. Police are often said to be afraid of the pastoralists who are perceived to be aggressive and prone to violence at the slightest provocation. Many communities have only one police officer assigned to them, making it difficult to respond to and address security and conflict-related issues in the community when the need arises. In a few cases, police have arrested and prosecuted both herders and vigilantes bearing firearms. More often, the country's dysfunctional law enforcement and criminal justice system fails to arrest or prosecute any perpetrators.

Increasingly, the Army has been deployed to address violence-prone areas. Notably, the launch of *Operation Cat Race* on 15 February 2018, targeting Nasarawa, Benue, Kogi, Taraba, Adamawa, and Kaduna, served to put an end to the violent clashes early in the year witnessed, particularly in Benue. The military is, however, fraught with allegations of bias and partiality favoring the pastoralists. The selection of senior military leadership from the predominantly Muslim north, and frequently from the Fulani ethnic group, serve as a justification for many local communities to silently mistrust the military.

Armed groups (militias/vigilantes)

To enforce the Open Grazing Prohibition and Establishment of Ranching law, the Benue state government transformed the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) into the 'Livestock Guards'. Unlike the CJTF, the Livestock Guards are all recruited from the Tiv farmers' side and are well armed. The Livestock Guards threaten to arrest pastoralists when they move in to farming areas with livestock, and as a result of these threats, pastoralists have moved their women, children, and elderly to Nasarawa state. Pastoralist communities view Livestock Guards as a negative factor in contributing to the escalation of conflict between farmers and pastoralists.

In other Middle Belt states, farming communities often form local militias by arming youths, particularly in more remote areas with poor police access. Such militias are frequently supported by various ethnic or religious leaders that hold significant community influence.

IDPs

The crisis has led to massive population displacements, with estimates ranging from 60,000 to 300,000 in just the past 3 years. Most of these IDPs are hosted in camps or in poor host communities lacking the bare minimum of social services. State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) are providing urgent humanitarian support to displaced populations, but it is far from sufficient. This increases pressure on natural resources thereby creating an environment for further conflict. It has, moreover, contributed to a perception on the grassroots level of a 'genocidal war', from which recovery will take a long time.

Youth

Youths are actors who play both positive and negative roles in the resolution and escalation of conflict in communities. Youths are often members of community peace committees and youth peace movements, adopters of modern EWER systems, and are economically active as field and livestock guards or entrepreneurs and early adopters of new market opportunities. Both farmer and pastoralist youths are identified as contributing negatively to conflict situations in cycles of reprisal attacks in the name of justice, self-defense and restoring honor, and through substance abuse that exacerbates violence and sexual abuses. However, youth are also drivers of various peace initiatives – particularly at the grassroots level. Efforts that target youth unemployment and conflict- and gender sensitization are important factors to be considered in the farmer herder crisis, and have the ability to unlock the vast peacebuilding potential that exist within this demographic group.

Women

As noted above, women and girls are significantly affected by violent conflict. Women and children usually make up the largest number of those displaced and in many instances women and young girls have been subjected to sexual violence. Families sometimes get split up and children are often left without guardians for protection. Young girls and women are often forced into sexual trades. The relatives of men killed in the violence often evict widows from their farmland. Moreover, post-conflict economic and social disenfranchisement renders women and girls even more vulnerable to sexual and economic predation.

Even though women are highly affected by conflict, they tend to play less active roles in formal conflict resolution and seldom directly participate in conflict resolution processes. This is due to cultural and religious norms limiting their roles. Women do tend to play the role of advising youth in their communities against acts that could escalate violent conflict therefore contradicting local conventional wisdom on women's inadequacies to participate in peacebuilding activities. To the extent they are included, women from farmer communities tend to be more active as members of the peace committees than the women from the pastoralist communities. This notwithstanding, women from pastoralist communities are critical stakeholders that any project will need to effectively engage with in promoting peace.

A piecemeal approach will not address the pervasive cycle of violence and multi-faceted nature of the herder-farmer crisis. Instead, a comprehensive and integrated approach that addresses the root causes of the conflict while reducing the vulnerability of communities is required. This is best done through restoring the social and natural capital needed to rebuild community coexistence, supporting basic services inherent to peacebuilding and sustainable livelihoods for both farmers and herders, making them mutually dependent and reinforcing.

The programmatic approach, therefore, is to design an inter-dependent cooperative framework that optimizes economic incentives to foster development and coexistence between herders and farmers, while ensuring that sufficient investment is made in rebuilding environmental assets to sustain livelihoods, as well as in social capital to support traditional mechanisms for

conflict prevention and resolution. Enabling a clear, informed and objective narrative about the root causes and nature of farmer-herder crisis is key to the success of this approach. A summary of the key drivers of herder-farmer conflict and their root causes is presented below, with possible solutions that help inform the proposed project interventions outlined in Section II.

Table 1: Summary analysis of root causes of key conflict drivers between herders and farmers

<p>Competition over land and water resources (water points, grazing land, fodder)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Root causes: environmental degradation, inadequate access to water and pasture, poor management of land/water/forest resources, poor maintenance and demarcation of grazing routes, population explosion, urbanization and infrastructure development, lack of consultation in land tenure/land sales of communal land • Impacts: shifting patterns of migration, increased encroachment of stock, land grabbing, loss of livelihoods (destruction of crop farms and killing of cattle / cattle rustling), food insecurity, loss of lives, displacement of people, rise of militia, psychological trauma • Solution: improved access to water and pasture, improved water/fodder/feedstocks, local peacebuilding structures and mechanisms promote local level dialogues and agreements between farmers and herders, value chain enhancements provide economic incentives for cooperation and coexistence, gender and youth responsive early warning systems developed, improved access to information for farmers and herders through targeted sensitization efforts <p>Politicized and vitriolic narrative of sectional, ethnic and religious identity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Root causes: political gains from indigenous/settler and ethnoreligious dichotomy, skewed media coverage, increased military operations in NE a push factor for southward movement of pastoralists and weapons, response to politicized narrative of sectional, ethnic and religious identity • Impacts: confusion over nature of conflict allows exploitation of the narrative, increased divisiveness between ethnic and religious groups, space created for criminality to flourish, fear/incapacitation at the local level over both conflicts and responses (military/militias/lack of civil authority response), arming up and reprisal cycles, radicalization • Solution: independent and credible narrative established, ethnic and religious community positive opinion leaders supported, clear links between state level structures and local level established, advocacy for evidence-based response to the crisis, research into scope and drivers of events provides nuancing of crisis <p>Weak Governance Institutions</p>

- **Root causes:** erosion of local capacity for conflict resolution, exclusion of traditional institutions from government, inadequate funding, low capacity, political rivalries based on weak social cohesion, insufficient public participation in governance
- **Impacts:** collapse of community values system, weak capacity for judicial and security agencies to respond, influence by politicized narratives, nepotism and discrimination, corruption, lack of credibility at local level and erosion of public trust
- **Solutions:** building/enhancing conflict prevention capacities at the state and local levels, improved links between state level structures and affected communities, promotion of inclusive dialogues on peacebuilding for enhanced coordination to foster inter-agency cooperation, support traditional and religious conflict prevention mechanisms, establish links to emerging Federal peace initiatives where possible

Ineffective security and law enforcement

- **Root causes:** lack of accountability, weak capacity to respond, politicized narrative, misuse of security agencies
- **Impacts:** rise of militia, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, impunity for criminality, loss of lives, property and livelihoods, lack of public trust, increased human rights and gender violations and abuses, impunity, cycle of reprisal attacks
- **Solutions:** gender-sensitive early warning systems improved, enhanced monitoring and accountability systems through human rights and gender-inclusive peacebuilding structures, improved civil-military relations, engagement of male and female youth

- b) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports **existing** Governmental and UN **strategic frameworks**, how it ensures **national ownership** and how the project complements/ builds on any other relevant interventions in this sector/area, including any lessons from previous PBF support.

Although the project is centered at the state-level, it links to a series of national level processes and mechanisms that have defined the broader Nigerian response to the crisis. In early 2018, President Buhari set up a Committee on Farmers-Herders Crisis, which is chaired by the Vice President and includes Governors from nine states across the country. The Governors of Taraba, Nasarawa and Benue State are all represented on this Committee. On behalf of the Federal Government, the Committee has developed and launched the National Livestock Transformation Plan in June 2018, which serves as the Federal Government's approach to addressing the farmers-herders crisis. The plan runs over the course of 10 years and spans six pillars of economic investment, conflict resolution, law and order, humanitarian relief, information, education and strategic communication, and cross-cutting issues. This project addresses several elements of this broader framework and has incorporated support to the states in domesticating and operationalizing the plan at state-level, establishing peacebuilding structures to enhance State capacity to engage proactively in this crisis, promoting dialogue around the crisis, and helping states link to local capacities for conflict prevention. It is also foreseen that the findings and successes that this project delivers upon could be scaled up within the scope of the broader efforts of the Federal Government.

The project further aligns with the strategic process of developing a national infrastructure for peace. The UN in Nigeria has long been supporting and advocating for a more robust infrastructure for peace in Nigeria, grounded in Nigerian law, with adequate funding and autonomy to support the country in addressing its many crises. Following support from the UN in 2017, the Senate on 19 July 2018 passed a Bill to Establish a National Commission for Peace, Reconciliation and Mediation. In a similar vein, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, H.E. Boss Mustapha, set up a committee in May to review and make recommendations for how Nigeria could set up such a commission to lead national work around peacebuilding. As the work to harmonize the legislative and executive processes moves forward, states have begun setting up their own structures. Kaduna State passed a law in 2017 to establish its Kaduna State Peace Commission, and Adamawa State is in the process of setting up a Peace, Rehabilitation and Re-construction Agency. These developments come out of a recommendation of the National Economic Council at the Security Summit held in August 2017, for the country and states to establish peace architectures to promote peaceful coexistence. This project directly supports the establishment and development of such infrastructures in the target states to strengthen national and local capacities at conflict prevention.

This project builds off experience from UNDP, UN Women, FAO and OHCHR in all of these key areas. UNDP has long supported Nigeria with enhancing capacities for conflict prevention, most notably through support to an infrastructure for peace. This resulted in the development of the National Peace Policy, which the National Commission for Peace is expected to take forward. Additionally, UNDP has worked closely with both Kaduna and Plateau States on supporting state-level peace infrastructures and developing comprehensive early warning early response systems. Similarly, UN Women has recently concluded a large project of state-level support targeting Plateau, Adamawa and Gombe states in building and improving upon gender-sensitive peace architectures. Also, with support from UN Women, a National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 (2017 -2020) was developed and launched in May 2017. The Plan makes provisions to address emerging peace and security issues in the country, from a gender perspective. FAO has worked closely with the Federal Government in developing the National Livestock Transformation Plan and is supporting its implementation. OHCHR is currently rolling out a human rights monitoring initiative in Benue State, upon which this project will build and further expand. The value added of this project is to further expand the UN's support to some of these areas in an integrated and holistic manner to yield tangible peace dividends for affected states and communities.

II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)

- a) A brief **description of the project content** – in a nutshell, what results is the project trying to achieve, and how does it aim to address the conflict analysis factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- sensitive).

The farmers-herders violence is both widespread and fluid in scope, making any geographic limitations to the implementation of the project challenging. Violence occurs in many different localities, and the dynamic movement of persons across community, local government, and state lines demand a flexible approach in selection of target areas. For example, when Benue State implemented the Open Grazing Prohibition Law on November 1st 2017, many pastoralists

were pushed northward into Nasarawa and Taraba states. Media reports suggested that the attacks on communities in Benue in early 2018 were reportedly coming from groups based in Nasarawa State. With Taraba having also passed, but not yet implemented or enforced, a similar law prohibiting open grazing, the Nasarawa-Benue-Taraba nexus emerges as a critical peacebuilding area for the farmer-herder crisis.

Although the recent escalation of the crisis has highlighted the volatile security environment on the ground, research suggests that the Nasarawa-Benue-Taraba nexus has long faced these problems. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), 28% of deaths in attacks between farmers and herders from 2014 – 2017 in Benue state occurred in Guma and Logo LGAs. In the same time period, farmer-herder violence in Taraba state claimed 49% of its casualties in Wukari LGA.¹¹ These striking death tolls around the Nasarawa-Benue-Taraba nexus indicate that targeting this area in a more focused manner can provide crucial peacebuilding dividends for affected communities.

This project will therefore target the three states of Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba with state-level activities, as well as two contiguous Local Government Areas (LGAs) in each of the three states for targeted interventions to promote peace. The geographic focus thus centers on the Benue River, where formalized and functional state-level peacebuilding infrastructure and early warning systems are lacking, agriculture and pastoralism are important livelihood and economic activities, and inter-state interactions are more easily facilitated enabling effective use of project funds.

The in-depth work with communities will target the following Local Government Areas: Ibi LGA and Wukari LGA (in Taraba), Awe LGA and Keana LGA (in Nasarawa), and Logo LGA and Guma LGA (in Benue). The target beneficiaries in these areas are outlined below.

Table 2: Indicative Beneficiary Populations in Target Areas

Target Area	Predicted Population in 2016 ¹²	% / # Women	% / # Men	% / # Youth (age 0-29)
Ibi LGA (Taraba)	112,700	49.4% / 55,674	50.6% / 57,026	73.3% / 82,609
Wukari LGA (Taraba)	318,400	47.84% / 152,323	52.16% / 166,077	72.9% / 232,114
Awe LGA (Nasarawa)	152,600	49.31% / 75,247	50.69% / 77,353	74.8% / 114,145
Keana LGA (Nasarawa)	110,400	49.97% / 55,167	50.03 / 55,233	74.5% / 82,248
Logo LGA (Benue)	228,900	49.24% / 112,710	50.76% / 116,190	74.1% / 169,615
Guma LGA (Benue)	262,100	49.88% / 130,735	50.12% / 131,365	74.5% / 195,265
Total	1,185,100	581,856	603,244	875,996

Source: <https://www.citypopulation.de/php/nigeria-admin.php>

In targeting these areas, the project will inevitably work with one state that has banned open grazing and enforced it (Benue); one state that has legislated to ban it but not enforced it (Taraba); and one state that has not yet passed any legislation on open grazing (Nasarawa).

¹¹ Sundberg, Ralph, and Erik Melander, 2013, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.50, no.4, 523-532.

¹² <https://www.citypopulation.de/php/nigeria-admin.php>.

The opportunities for leveraging this project for lessons learned and developing of best practices is legion, including for demonstrated conflict prevention programming that delivers peace dividends to affected populations in different contexts.

The project is structured around four pillars that interlink and provide a robust response to strengthening the capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Benue, Nasarawa, and Taraba. These pillars are:

Outcome 1: Effective and gender-sensitive infrastructure for peace in place at the state level to support conflict prevention

The violence has exacted a heavy toll on thousands of people and has frayed many of the connectors, especially inter-ethnic and inter-religious ones, at the local level. The response, however, has remained overwhelmingly security-dominated. While the magnitude of the crisis does call for the involvement and engagement of security forces in some instances, it seemingly remains the only tool used in the government's efforts at addressing the crisis. Lacking effective structures and systems to engage in dialogue in a proactive manner based on early indicators, violence escalates and a reactive security response is triggered. There is thus a need to support the states in enhancing the capacities of engaging in this crisis in a proactive and preventive manner that leverages dialogue as a primary tool of mitigating the impact of the conflict. Interventions will promote the participation of the various constituencies'- farmers, herders, security forces, and in particular, women and youth (who are often not represented in traditional institutions for conflict mediation and resolution) in the peacebuilding infrastructure.

This project will provide support to states to establish state-level structures that can help drive the peacebuilding agenda and strengthen a proactive and dialogue-centered response to the crisis. These structures will be supported with the development of comprehensive early warning early response systems, which helps identify early risk factors of violence. This becomes a powerful tool in convening civil society, security agencies and other influencers around the target states to discuss structured and appropriate responses to early warnings and supports the mandated peace architecture to drive the peacebuilding agenda in the state. Aside from the catalytic investment in an EWERS, support will also be provided in operationalizing elements of UNSCR 1325 (which underscore the need to promote the inclusion of women in peacebuilding), as well as facilitating constructive inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue at various levels. Specifically, Outcome 1 will aim to achieve the following outputs:

- *Output 1.1 – Establishment of state-level agency/commission/structure to drive gender-sensitive peacebuilding agenda*
- *Output 1.2 – State peacebuilding agency/commission/structure supported to drive gender-sensitive peacebuilding agenda*
- *Output 1.3 – Gender-sensitive early warning and early response capacity developed, supported and improved*
- *Output 1.4 – Constructive dialogue promoted through inter-ethnic and inter-religious exchanges*

Outcome 2: Strengthening Economic Interdependence between farmers and herders

The violence between farmers and herders have devastated many communities, particularly those whose livelihoods revolve around livestock and farming. In especially impacting the food producing states of the Middle Belt, the farmers-herders violence risks compromising food security more broadly in Nigeria, with increased prices as a result of production shortages and market disruptions. Furthermore, there is a need to translate the National Livestock Transformation Plan into action and begin to invest in building capacities to take this work forward at the state level. Efforts targeted at supporting the livelihoods and economic growth in these areas must, as a matter of priority, seek to build mutually interdependent relationships between different groups and communities to have a preventive and sustainable impact. Successive missions to the affected areas of the crisis has pointed to this, as well as the potential for catalytic investments in value chains around alternative fodder/feedstocks and the untapped economic potential that exists.

This project will therefore, under this outcome, provide livelihood development and support to victims of violence, especially women and youth, in an effort to support affected communities in rebuilding their economic potential. Efforts will also include support to fodder banks and developing alternative feedstocks as a means to strengthen the economic interdependence between groups and promote value chain development for farming and livestock sectors in a gender and youth inclusive manner. This will include broad sensitization of the economic opportunities and linking up to nascent and developing markets. In line with the National Livestock Transformation Plan, FAO will support in surveying of land as well as piloting a concept on pasture and water harvesting as a means to reduce competition over natural resources. The central purpose of this pillar is to establish a mutually beneficial economic relationship between farming and herding communities, which have for centuries existed, but has broken down in recent decades due to demographic, environmental and political stresses. In light of this, livelihood support through vocational training will also be undertaken to help create an enabling environment of capacity to support new and developing markets.¹³ These activities will be done closely with local businesses and cooperatives to act as replicators of project investments, and ensure that those investments are relevant and sustainable in the local economy for increased innovation and impact. In doing so, Outcome 2 will aim to achieve two key outputs:

- *Output 2.1 – Improved land, fodder/feedstock and water management to reduce competition over natural resources*
- *Output 2.2 – Alternative fodder and feedstocks promoted to reduce encroachment impacts and incentivize farmer-herder cooperation*

Outcome 3: Enhanced accountability promotes increased effectiveness of response to the farmers-herders crisis

One of the most prominent grievances in this crisis centers around the notion of lack of accountability and inaction on the part of security forces and judicial institutions. The clashes stem back decades, but in a context where perpetrators have not been held to account, they have grown more violent as increasingly deadly weapons have become intertwined in the

¹³ A model for livelihood support has been developed and is already being implemented by UNDP in multiple states in Nigeria. This has provided a series of lessons learned as well as evaluation findings, that demonstrate that this model has a high retention rate (>95%) over the course of the six months of training.

competition over lands and natural resources. At the center of this is a lack of accountability on both sides – where pastoralists are victimized due to the increasing banditry and cattle rustling, and farmers are victimized due to the encroachment of lands and destruction of livelihoods. The importance of supporting the security agencies in a more effective, transparent, and accountable response to the crisis thus becomes paramount.

This project will work closely with the security agencies, the National Human Rights Commission, and civil society organizations to promote a rights-based approach to the security-dominated response to the crisis. This will entail supporting the National Human Rights Commission in convening partners at the state level; training of security agencies on rules of engagement, code of conduct, sexual exploitation and abuse; support to local level engagement with both formal and informal security actors (such as vigilante groups). In addition, the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights will pilot a human rights monitoring initiative in Benue State that will see detailed monitoring, reporting, and analysis of human rights violations and abuses, including GBV and SEA, in Benue State. This is intended to strengthen the transparency and accountability of the federal and state-level response to the crisis in Benue, which has already become highly polarized. It will also help support the national stakeholders who have the mandate to hold to account perpetrators of human rights abuses and violations through increased information and ability to investigate the reported crimes. The two main outputs under Outcome 3 are:

- *Output 3.1 – Capacity of monitoring, investigation and follow up on human rights offences enhanced*
- *Output 3.2 – Increased civil-military/security agencies cooperation and dialogue*

Outcome 4: Improved understanding of the crisis encourages evidence-based advocacy, targeted investments and innovative solutions

The farmers-herders crisis has contributed to a vitriolic narrative and high levels of polarization in the affected states. Violent incidents are shrouded by differing reports, making an objective understanding of the crisis difficult. The magnitude and politicization of the crisis demands that objective and impartial information is available to help inform the response to the crisis as well as the public debate. Ongoing initiatives in the affected states and communities also suggest that credible information could go a long way in countering the polarized narratives that exist, as well as preventing the impact of unverified claims being spread over social media networks.

This project will therefore set up an Information Management and Analysis Unit (IMAU)¹⁴ to help provide credible and impartial analysis on the crisis. Gender and youth dis-aggregated data will be gathered to enable project gender and youth targeted interventions and broader advocacy. The IMAU will harness information around the farmers herders crisis – both information collected through project-related activities, as well as information collected from other sources – validate this information and make it publicly available. The publicization of information and analysis will take the form of producing various reports, infographics, maps,

¹⁴ IMAU capacities will be placed in the Resident Coordinator's Office to promote shared information, joint analysis and a common UN coordination position on the farmers-herders crisis. The IMAU staff would have a matrix reporting line to the Project Manager for deliverables under this project to ensure accountability on project activities.

and projections, which will help produce a clearer picture of the crisis with the aim of producing better informed responses. While the IMAU aims to contribute to an improved understanding of the crisis generally, it is also expected to have significant potential for the United Nations advocacy efforts as it enables a credible source of detailed information in this highly delicate and sensitive crisis, more clearly identifying actors and potential project and programme beneficiaries. It is also expected to help showcase sustainable solutions to the crisis that government, other international stakeholders and the private sector can invest in and help bring to scale. In such a scenario, this project would have a highly catalytic effect in helping to shape an impactful peacebuilding response to this national crisis. The two main outputs under Outcome 4 are:

- *Output 4.1 – Information Management and Analysis Unit provides reliable and credible information on farmers-herders crisis*
 - *Output 4.2 – Objective and verified information on the crisis is made publicly available*
- b) **Project result framework**, outlining all project results, outputs, activities with indicators of progress, baselines and targets (must be gender- and age- sensitive). Use **Annex B**; no need to provide additional narrative here.

Please refer to Annex B.

- c) Provide a **project-level ‘theory of change’** – i.e. how do you expect these interventions to lead to results and why have these interventions been selected. Specify if any of these interventions are particularly risky.

(Note: Change may happen through various and diverse approaches, i.e. social cohesion may be fostered through dialogue or employment opportunities or joint management of infrastructure. The selection of which approach should depend on context-specific factors. What basic assumptions about how change will occur have driven your choice of programming approach?)

Conflicts between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers in Nigeria’s Middle Belt states have escalated in frequency and intensity over the last decade to the point where fatalities, displacement and economic loss is hampering the hard-earned development gains in the affected states. The underlying issue of competition over natural resources such as limited land, water and fodder has been exacerbated by a breakdown in traditional local peacebuilding and dialogue mechanisms, governance failures, increasingly vitriolic and polarized narratives for political gain, and poor security and law enforcement responses. The multi-dimensional effects of the crises have been overwhelming, and state and federal authorities have been unable to effectively address the crisis despite recent policy steps on peacebuilding and resource management.

If states have increased capacities in proactively addressing the crisis through dialogue; a mutually economic beneficial relationship between farmers and herders can be established; security agencies respond more effectively and accountably to the crisis; and the polarized narratives in this crisis are effectively countered through verified and validated information; **then** the crisis will be transformed, and peaceful coexistence will be possible.

Figure 1: Conceptual Outline of Project Outcomes and Corresponding Root Causes Being Addressed




Figure 1 outlines the four outcomes (inner circle) as well as the root causes (peripheral boxes) identified in Section I that each outcome will help address. Efforts under Outcome 1 will enhance conflict prevention and mitigation capacities at the state and local levels. This is frequently cited across Nigeria as one of the major challenges to the many conflicts and crises and can be expected to have great value beyond addressing the farmer-herder crisis in the affected states. In supporting states to set up peace agencies/structures/commissions and developing comprehensive and contextualized early warning early response systems, this project will also ensure that traditional rulers, religious leaders, women, youth and other key stakeholders are closely engaged. This will provide for a more robust public engagement and participation in shaping peacebuilding at the state and local levels. Activities under Outcome 2 will help to reduce the competition over water and pasturelands, as well as help states improve in areas of management and use of natural resources as recommended by the National Livestock Transformation Plan. In full consultation and agreement by neighboring communities, the pilot envisaged under Outcome 2 would leverage heavily on the consultations and dialogue activities being planned under Outcome 1, establishing strong synergies between the two areas of work. Outcome 3 will directly address the issues of accountability and misuse of security agencies. In enhancing capacities to improve the monitoring, investigation and follow up of human rights abuses and violations, security agencies will be put under increased pressure to effectively and professionally respond to the crisis. Outcome 4 interventions will help in promoting a more neutral, evidence-based and well-informed media debate around the crisis. Over time, such a debate can help unpack the hardened narratives that the crisis has built up, in particular around ethno-religious identity, paving the way for peaceful coexistence.

Aside from addressing these root causes, the proposed project's integrated approach is also expected to address certain dividers, or drivers of the crisis. These are not root causes per se, but their existence within the crisis constitutes an impediment to peaceful coexistence. For

example, Outcome 2 aims to support the development of local value chains that help bring farmers and herders together in mutually beneficial economic exchanges. These have for years existed, with both communities trading goods and supporting each other through local agreements and negotiated arrangements. The crisis has, however, severed many of these ties and Outcome 2 aims to provide catalytic support to unlocking the untapped economic potential in the agricultural and livestock value chains to help revitalize such cooperation. Similarly, Outcome 3 has been specifically designed to enhance awareness and understanding of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) amongst security agencies. The challenges of SEA and SGBV have been well documented by human rights monitoring groups in the counterinsurgency efforts in North East Nigeria,¹⁵ but equally undermine the security response in the affected states that this project targets. The protection of women and girls is central for a professional, effective, and equitable security response. In providing such a response, security agencies can help contribute to a more conducive foundation for girls and women to engage productively on, as well as increase trust in security agencies and, per extension, government. In the absence of such a security response, however, security agencies will continue to be perceived as incompetent and partial actors in this crisis – not just by women themselves, but by all communities affected by SEA and SGBV. It is foreseen that through tackling an amalgamation of root causes and dividers/drivers that have emerged since the onset of the crisis, that this project will deliver tangible peacebuilding dividends to affected populations.

- d) **Project implementation strategy** – explain **how** the project will undertake the activities to ensure most effective and efficient achievement of results, including justification for geographic zones, criteria for beneficiary selection, timing among various activities, coherence between results and any other information on implementation approach (must be gender- and age-sensitive).

The holistic nature of the project demands a flexible but well-thought through approach to implementation. Activities will target both the state-level and community-level for specific communities that are particularly affected by the violence. A profiling exercise of communities and existing local institutions will be undertaken to identify the target groups for Outcome 2 at the start of the project. At the state-level, the added value is to provide more coherence and support to local level peacebuilding initiatives. This is expected to help support in establishing synergies amongst already ongoing activities in the targeted states. At the community level, implementation will be guided by an area-based approach, where targeted dialogue and peacebuilding activities will be sequenced with activities around livelihood support and economic revitalization, to leverage opportunities of reshaping the relationship between different groups in the community.¹⁶

Implementation of this project will build upon work already done by the UN System and other partners on the ground. UNDP, FAO and UNHCR, with support from the UN Human Security

¹⁵ See for example, Amnesty International: “They Betrayed Us: Women who Survived Boko Haram Rapes, Starved and Detained in Nigeria” 24 May 2018.

¹⁶ Although an area-based approach will be the basis of the implementation strategy, certain activities may be undertaken outside the area. In determining the area-based approach, the project will look at where the result or impact of its activities will be. For example, supporting pasture development and irrigation systems outside a community could have a high preventive impact in terms of reducing the extent to which cattle is brought into the community and tension escalates. In this case, the activity is not in the community, but the peacebuilding result is.

Trust Fund, are piloting an initiative in Benue and some communities in Nasarawa that uses the human security approach at leveraging the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Similarly, UN Women and UNDP have collaborated on a UN Women-led *women, peace and security* project in three northern states which aimed at supporting the peace architecture for effective and gender-sensitive peacebuilding responses to crises. This project will build upon lessons learned from these initiatives and expand the work to support peacebuilding in Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba in a broad and integrated manner whilst especially addressing the farmers-herders violence.

This project aims to build upon and synergize with the already existing project funded by the UN Human Security Trust Fund (UNHSTF). The UNHSTF project leverages the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in the farmers-herders crisis through applying the human security approach in five Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Benue State (most affected by the crisis) as well as some communities in Nasarawa State. This is being done through a partnership between UNHCR, UNDP and FAO and the State and Federal Government authorities. The programmatic focus is on enhancing protection and rolling out early recovery efforts to help transition affected communities from humanitarian support towards longer term development. In addressing these areas, the project aims to strengthen human security of affected populations, laying the foundation for improved social/national cohesion as well as taking into account the regional dimensions of the crisis. On the contrary, the PBSO project outlined in this proposal goes deeper and takes its point of departure in a conflict analysis that has identified the root causes and drivers of the crisis, which has informed both its approach and its partners (UNDP, UN Women, FAO, OHCHR). The conflict analysis has also highlighted the importance of improving women's inclusion and empowerment in the peacebuilding process, as well as the need for a stronger emphasis on human rights to ensure an improved and accountable security response to the crisis. In line with the prevention agenda of the Secretary-General, and informed by *Pathways to Peace*, this project aims to promote the effective functioning of various institutions (through setting up infrastructures for peace, promoting work of human rights organizations, and enhancing security agencies' response, etc.) to provide an enabling environment for peace to be realized, whilst also including targeted efforts at the community level that are expected to deliver tangible peace dividends to affected populations.

These differences notwithstanding, the two projects will synergize and complement each other in areas such as support to value chain development, and establishment of pasture and water points, and supporting a transformation of the relationships between farmers and herders. The huge expectations and reality on the ground, in a conflict hitherto shunned by many stakeholders, makes this complementarity crucial for the United Nations to deliver impact at scale. The revival of economic exchange is seen as strategic in helping to diffuse the antagonistic narratives and provides an entry point in the crisis to begin addressing the tensions and promote peacebuilding. It has further added value of promoting sustainability of results under both projects, as the economic cooperation initiated is expected to continue through the economic dividends benefitting local communities. These activities will therefore be undertaken in close coordination between the two projects to ensure strategic targeting and sequencing of interventions that become mutually reinforcing, avoid duplication and overlap, and optimize resources in delivering results on the ground.

Many stakeholders work closely with this crisis at the grassroots level, and this project will link closely to these organizations as well. USAID has supported both Mercy Corps and Search for Common Ground in separate peacebuilding initiatives that focus on inter-ethnic/inter-

religious dialogue and exchange, campaigns and quick-impact and high-visibility projects, etc. A vibrant and highly active national civil society scene further presents a broad range of stakeholders to synergize with at the state and community level.

To ensure that this project is effectively implemented and delivers the desired peacebuilding impact, community monitoring will form an important element of the implementation strategy and the broader monitoring and evaluation framework. This project foresees partnering with an independent organization with a strong track record of assessing peacebuilding impact and contract the same to undertake monitoring missions to the targeted states and communities. This organization will conduct dialogue sessions and assessments in the communities targeted by the project, to reliably and independently identify progress towards delivering peace dividends. To ensure that this project is held accountable to national partners, it is foreseen that this organization would report findings and conclusions to any state-level peacebuilding agency/commission/structure or relevant focal point as assigned by the Governor of the state.

III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

- a) **Recipient organizations and implementing partners** – list direct recipient organizations and their implementing partners (international and local), specifying the Lead Organization and providing a brief justification for the choices, based on mandate, experience, local know-how and existing capacity.

UNDP is the Lead Organization for this project and is responsible for the overall project coordination of implementation and work outlined herein. UNDP will lead given its mandate, expertise and experiences in driving development gains in support of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. However, the integrated and holistic approach to peacebuilding that this project takes, demands a broader, inter-agency partnership that also leverages upon the expertise and experience of UN Women, FAO and OHCHR.¹⁷ These agencies have been selected based on their comparative advantages in certain elements of the broader approach and enhances the prospects of delivering peace dividends within the project time frame.

All four agencies are considered resident in Nigeria, with staff on the ground. UNDP and FAO are in the process of setting up a field office in Benue state, which this project will be able to leverage upon. OHCHR has recently partnered with OCHA on a human rights monitoring initiative in the same state, which will further inform the work planned under this project. FAO is currently implementing projects in Nasarawa and Taraba states, and under this project, partners will set up a project office to enable access and effective reach into Taraba.

These four agencies bring important comparative advantages into this project. UNDP and UN Women have supported several states in establishing peacebuilding agencies and setting up early warning early response systems. Notable examples include the support that UNDP and UN Women have lent to Operation Rainbow in Plateau State to address the violence that flared up in 2010. UN Women have recently concluded an EU-funded project that saw the establishment of an Agency for Peacebuilding, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in Adamawa

¹⁷ UNDP annual budget \$26,601,384 (2016) with delivery rate @ 77%; \$28,473,307 (2017) with delivery rate @ 84%; UN Women annual budget \$5,832,062 (2016) with delivery rate @ 58%; \$6,395,492 (2017) with delivery rate @ 79%; FAO annual budget \$7,645,013 (2016) delivery rate @ 81%; \$24,449,556 (2017) deliver rate @ 81%. NB: FAO's aggregate annual budget is projected on expected donors support and delivery is dependent on funds received. All projects that received funding support had 100% delivery rate.

State. UNDP has also supported the Kaduna State Peace Commission in developing its strategic plan. Ongoing work with Kaduna State Peace Commission includes setting up of an ICT-based early warning early response system. These experiences will be particularly useful in supporting Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba in setting up similar structures at the state level. It should also be noted that UNDP has long supported a national process to create such a structure, which has recently received added impetus with the passing of the bill in the Senate in July 2018, calling for the establishment of a national commission to lead these efforts.

FAO has long worked to support agriculture and livestock production in Nigeria, as part of its broader efforts to combat hunger and end poverty. FAO have the largest livestock department with technical expertise and projects globally that serve to specifically support sustainable livelihoods in the agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry sectors. In Nigeria, FAO has worked closely with the federal government in developing the National Livestock Transformation Plan, which serves as the national government's response to the farmer-herder crisis. As these national efforts are stepped down to the state level, FAO can be expected to play a key role in providing technical advice and expertise to the national government and states in operationalizing this plan and making sure it is successful in mitigating the violence.

OHCHR has recently scaled up its presence in country with a particular focus on North East Nigeria. However, with the quickly evolving farmer-herder crisis, the Senior Human Rights Advisor has led many fact-finding missions to affected communities in the Middle Belt. The discussions and dialogue with these communities have continually pointed toward the lack of an effective security response in preventing or mitigating the violence. There are concerns around the ability of security forces to fulfill their mandates. A series of human rights monitoring missions to Nigeria have recently been conducted, with a particular focus on the farmer-herder crisis. It is thus imperative that OHCHR lend its support in promoting a more effective and accountable security response to the crisis.

Aside from leveraging on four different UN agencies, this proposal also calls for targeted support to civil society organizations and community-based organizations. Discussions are ongoing to formalize a partnership with Search for Common Ground, who have a long track record on working on the farmer-herder crisis in the Middle Belt (in fact, they chair the Peace and Security Network subgroup on farmers-herders in Nigeria). Leveraging Search's experience in facilitating dialogue with different community leaders, including women and youth groups, this project aims to incorporate a dialogue mechanism that can quickly be used to de-escalate tensions. Their work will be further supported by local stakeholders, such as BENGONET in Benue state and similar NGO networks in Nasarawa and Taraba states. Moreover, close dialogue will be sustained with key community networks, such as Miyetti Allah chapters in the different states, state-level focal points for All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), the Christian Association of Nigeria, Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), Federation of Muslim Women's Association in Nigeria (FOMWAN) and National Council of Women's Societies (NCWS). Such support will be broadly facilitative, in terms of ensuring that CSOs and CBOs are linked up to key peacebuilding and human rights architectures for a more effective and relevant response.

The project also foresees engaging closely with key structures at the state-level, including the peacebuilding architecture, security architecture and human rights architecture that is available in the target states. The project will work closely with the three Governors' of each state, as well as relevant focal points as assigned by them.

- b) **Project management and coordination** – present the project implementation team, including positions and roles and explanation of which positions are to be funded by the project (to which percentage). Explain project coordination and oversight arrangements. Fill out project implementation readiness checklist in **Annex C**.

The project will be managed by a Project Manager (P-3) which will be based in Abuja.¹⁸ The Project Manager will be supported by a small team of operations and programme staff, which will ensure timely delivery of activities and results. A part time Procurement and Logistics Assistant (G-6) will support the Project Manager in the Abuja office. In addition, a Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst (NO-B) and Finance and Admin Assistant (G-3) will support all activities in the project but will be in Makurdi, Benue State, to ensure proximity to project activities. Staff based in Abuja will undertake regular missions to the field offices to support the work being done in the affected communities, particularly around key activities.

In addition to the support staff, the programme staff will lead the day-to-day implementation of programmatic activities in the target areas. Two Project Officers (NO-B) will be brought on board and based in target states to ensure close coordination and engagement with state-level and community-level stakeholders. One Project Officer will be based in Benue and one in Taraba. It is foreseen that Nasarawa state could be effectively covered by the Project Officer for Benue State. In covering Nasarawa, this person would also be supported by the Project Manager, whose location in Abuja allows for easy access into all areas of Nasarawa State. Such an arrangement reduces the coordination costs involved, ensuring that a larger share of the overall budget goes to the affected communities.

The proposed personnel structure accounts for approximately 24% of the total budget for the project. The reason for this cost is threefold. First, the project covers a vast geographical area. In order to effectively engage with stakeholders across all three states, it is foreseen that the project will need two field offices to operate effectively. This will facilitate a quick set up, establishing the necessary relationships and partnerships, and help shape the right response to deliver strategic results in the 18-month period. To bring down some of the staffing costs, this project does leverage and cost-share staff for the field office in Benue State which is partly funded through a UN Human Security Trust Fund project. However, the broader scope of this project necessitates a more expansive coordination structure, which has cost implications. Second, this project has built in a robust accountability framework which will ensure that it remains accountable both to the communities it serves as well as the respective state governments. The community monitoring function and associated personnel costs for monitoring and evaluation amount to \$189,484.50. This cost, however, is not only an important investment in project accountability, but is also important to help develop best practices on demonstrated solutions in this crisis. In this light, the project aims to be catalytic through developing concrete approaches and initiatives with proven peacebuilding impact that can be scaled up. Finally, and closely linked to the above, are the personnel costs associated with the information management, analysis and advocacy elements of the project. These are activities that are notoriously resource intensive due to the need for adequate expertise and staffing. For this project, the personnel costs associated with this work accounts for 3.5% of the overall


¹⁸ It is anticipated that the Project Manager will be recruited for this position. Recruitment will be fast-tracked to ensure that someone is identified and quickly deployed to lead this effort, but in the interim, UNDP has already identified an existing Project Manager in house that is able to lead this work in the beginning. Her experience from managing a project in Benue state will be highly advantageous in getting this project quickly off the ground whilst recruitment for the P-3 is ongoing.

project budget – an investment that must be seen in light of the importance to ensure that the demonstrated successes are effectively showcased and communicated to help incentivize further investments in the solutions developed. In sum, the investment in personnel costs under this project are expected to help the project quickly build close relationships and partnerships in the vast geographic expanse in support of delivering in the 18 months, whilst also enabling and incentivizing a broader response that involves a wide array of actors, including the private sector, for a more holistic and sustainable response to the crisis.

The coordination structure proposed does not include substantive and thematic expertise foreseen under the project, whose costs have been built into the different activities or costed as separate personnel under the project personnel section of the budget. These staff will form an integrated part of the project team and also be answerable to the Project Manager for deliverables and progress on results. In turn, the Project Manager will be held accountable by the four agencies involved in this project through a Project Coordination Committee (PCC). The PCC will include the Heads of Agencies for UNDP, UN Women, FAO and OHCHR and meet on a monthly basis for the first quarter to ensure that the project is quickly set up and commences with implementation immediately. Following satisfactory progress on project set up, the PCC may choose to set these meetings to bi-monthly frequency. PCC meetings will also be scheduled prior to any Steering Committee (SC) meeting to ensure coordination and consensus on the key issues to be discussed during the SC meetings.

The SC will be comprised of the members of the PCC as well as representatives from the three states and co-chaired by a representative from the Ministry for Budget and National Planning and the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office, and meet at the beginning of the project, and thereafter on an annual basis. In addition to the key stakeholders in this project, it is foreseen that the SC will also include a representative from Search for Common Ground, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the National Orientation Agency (NOA), the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders’ Association (MACBAN), national farmers’ association, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), and Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI). This coordination structure would provide a robust inter-agency framework to deliver as one on the collective outcomes outlined in Section II.

Figure 2: Project Coordination Organogram



The above structure leverages on existing and already funded capacities to promote increased coherence and coordination with ongoing initiatives and allows coordination costs to be kept as low as possible. Costs of the coordination structure for Benue and Nasarawa states are therefore already partially covered as indicated above.

- c) **Risk management** – assess the level of risk for project success (low, medium and high) and provide a list of major project specific risks and how they will be managed, including the approach to updating risks and making project adjustments. Include any Do No Harm issues and project mitigation.

RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION TABLE			
1	Description of risks and negative externalities	Impact	Probability
	Continued violent conflict and killings in target states lead to instability in the communities resulting to limited roll out of project implementation	High	Medium
	Proposed mitigation measures	Responsible organization	
	Implementation of project activities that will support addressing violent conflicts. These are activities in the Peacebuilding Architecture and National and Regional Framework for Addressing Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict Pillars	All project partners	
2	Description of risks and negative externalities	Impact	Probability

	Reluctance of farmers and herders' communities to work together under this project	High	Medium
	Proposed mitigation measures	Responsible organization	
	In working through a CSO with a track record of promoting dialogue and fostering inter-ethnic and inter-religious coexistence, particularly in the context of this crisis, the project will have an entry point and understand how it may need to adapt to realities in the different states/communities. Outcome 2 provides economic incentives for collaboration, which can help incentivize different groups and stakeholders to partner and collaborate.	CSOs involved in the project	
	Description of risks and negative externalities	Impact	Probability
	Elections in early 2019 provide for a politically volatile environment in target states, hampering implementation.	High	Medium
	Proposed mitigation measures	Responsible organization	
3	The project's coordination structure is designed to ensure close collaboration and communication with state-level focal points, which will ensure a close dialogue and cooperation throughout the elections. Additionally, the project will be closely discussed and consulted with Governors and state-level focal points, but overall sign off will be done by the Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning, as the custodian of the United Nations Sustainable Development Partnership Framework 2018 – 2022.	UNDP	
	Description of risks and negative externalities	Impact	Probability
	Hesitancy of herdsmen to buy alternative fodder/feedstock	Medium	Low
	Proposed mitigation measures	Responsible organization	
4	The project will closely engage representatives of herdsmen in the early stages of implementation to garner the necessary buy-in of these stakeholders in the alternative fodder/feedstock concept. Additionally, the research provided will outline the benefits to herdsmen and their livestock in leveraging this opportunity.	FAO, UNDP, CSOs involved in the project	
	Description of risks and negative externalities	Impact	Probability
	Poor coordination and flexibility of project to adapt to changing conditions in the target states	High	Low
	Proposed mitigation measures	Responsible organization	
5	The proposed management and coordination structure is foreseen to help regularly assess progress and early on identify obstacles to effective project implementation. Targeted efforts have also been integrated to appraise communities' needs and level of satisfaction	UNDP, UN Women, FAO, OHCHR, and all other partners	

	to ensure that the project is proactive and addresses the needs of the beneficiaries. Regular review the project risk log to make adjustments for uncertainties and effective project risk management.		
6	Description of risks and negative externalities	Impact	Probability
	States unwilling to allocate land for pasture development	Low	Medium
	Proposed mitigation measures	Responsible organization	
	The commitment to doing one pilot under this project reflects the inherent political risks involved in the pasture development pilot. Based on consultations, however, it is deemed possible to secure this land between one of the three target states to ensure the pilot can be tested.	FAO, UNDP	
7	Description of risks and negative externalities	Impact	Probability
	Project's support for the National Livestock Development Plan is perceived as partial, hampering engagement with some stakeholders	High	Low
	Proposed mitigation measures	Responsible organization	
	Continuous dialogue with key stakeholders will point to the added value for both farmers and herdsman, and that the project entails activities that target both groups in the community. Additional feedback will be provided through the community monitoring mechanism, which will help provide recommendations for how to address perceived biases in the local context.	UNDP, CSOs involved in the project.	

- d) **Monitoring and evaluation** – What will be the M&E approach for the project, including M&E expertise in the project team and main means and timing of collecting data? Include a break-down of M&E budget that the project is putting aside, including for collection of baseline and end line data for indicators and independent evaluation, and an approximate M&E timeline. Ensure at least 5-7% of the project budget is set aside for M&E activities.

A Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst (NO-B) will be recruited to coordinate monitoring and evaluation activities and interface with project partners. The Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst will work closely across the four UN agencies as well as state and CSO partners (such as BENGONET in Benue state) to ensure a holistic, coordinated and integrated process for tracking results. These activities will be done in close collaboration with the Ministry for Budget and National Planning, who will have the overall coordinating lead for monitoring of results, as well as relevant ministries/departments/agencies at the state level to ensure that progress feeds into and supports state-level and national efforts towards building peace and fostering development. Regular monitoring exercises will be conducted to collect data and used for decision making and to produce visibility materials in the form of videos, audio materials, media reports, publications, etc. which will be disseminated to relevant stakeholders. In order to support sound management of the project and provide quality reporting, partners in

the state will be supported to establish and maintain a system for monitoring progress of the implementation of the project using pre-defined indicators and targets in the work plan. Project reports will be generated and used for coordination meetings and management decision making. It will also be shared using agreed channels to keep relevant stakeholders informed of project progress.

In addition, an independent NGO/think tank/research institute will be partnered with to undertake baseline, monitoring and evaluation activities to ensure that the project delivers on peace dividends in the target areas (see Section II d for more information). Given the highly technical expertise required, this work will be tendered through a competitive process. Prospective partners have already been contacted and expressed an interest, and the process is expected to be concluded prior to the end of 2018.

Monitoring and evaluation activities will be undertaken in line with the milestones outlined in the log frame (see Annex B). In total, these activities constitute around \$293,323 of the total budget. This includes the cost of the Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst, the community monitoring mechanism,

Description of Activity Budgeted	Amount
Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst	\$46,323
Community Monitoring (Activity 1.2.3)	\$120,000
Mapping of infrastructures for peace (Activity 1.1.1)	\$30,000
Support to CSO to build capacity and raised awareness (Activity 1.4.1, 10% M&E)	\$12,000
Profiling farmers, herders, women, youth, victims of conflict (Activity 2.2.1, 20% M&E)	\$10,000
Human rights pilot initiative (Activity 3.1.1, 10% M&E)	\$25,000
Independent Evaluation	\$50,000
Total Monitoring and Evaluation Budgeted	\$293,323
Percentage Monitoring and Evaluation of Total Project Budget	9.78%

- e) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability** – Briefly explain the project’s exit strategy to ensure that the project can be wrapped up at the end of the project duration, either through sustainability measures, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the project will do to try to ensure this support from the start.

This project is part of a larger UN Nigeria investment into the Middle Belt to promote enhanced conflict prevention and sustainable development for affected states to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. This project will build off a proven partnership model, currently in place in Benue state, where state governments work closely with UN partners on delivering activities and results jointly. In so doing, the capacity of state partners to assume responsibilities and sustain activities beyond the duration of the project is enhanced. Additionally, this project sets aside funding both for engaging the private sector as well as sensitizing a broad range of partners (government, international, private sector) on innovative ways that could be scaled up. The modular nature of this project allows for easy scale up, both within the targeted states, as well as to other states affected by the crisis.

IV. Project budget

Please provide a brief justification for the proposed budget, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

Annex A.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 June;
- Annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 November;
- Final (end of project) narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months after the operational closure of the project;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;

- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

Annex A.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

Reporting:

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provide no later than 15 June;
- Annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 November;
- Final (end of project) narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months after the operational closure of the project;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

Public Disclosure.

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent website (<http://www.mptf.undp.org>)

Final Project Audit for NUNO projects

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such activity must be included in the project budget. If this is not the case, a budgetary revision, to include such costs, must be provided by submitting the Project Budget Revision and No-Cost Extension form

As part of the PBSO and MPTF-O review of the project document, PBSO will obtain and consider the following:

- Annual report of the Recipient Organization;
- Audited Financial Statements for the last three years;
- Proof of previous funding by the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF;
- A letter from RO's external auditor stating that the RO has the requisite financial systems, internal controls and capacity to manage project funds. At the time of submission, the auditor must also provide membership of a national or regional audit association;
- Be registered as a non-profit, tax exempt organization (in both, the country where headquarter is located and in country of implementation)

Annex B: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	indicator milestones
Outcome 1: Effective and gender-sensitive infrastructure for peace in place at the state level to support conflict prevention		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 a. Number of peacebuilding structures established per state and percentage of women and youth participating in these structures</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 3 (1 per state; 35% women/youth participation)</p>	Constitution and meeting minutes, PB structure reports	<p>6 months: Agreements with governor's offices on PB structures</p> <p>12 months: PB structure constitution meeting held in each state</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 b. Percentage of women and youth surveyed who perceive that peace infrastructure adequately reflects and addresses their concerns</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 50% women/youth</p>	Survey reports by monitoring CSO	<p>6 months: Monitoring CSO baseline survey complete</p> <p>12 Months: 50% of gender sensitization workshops completed</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1c. Percentage of conflicts reported through EWERS in project area and percentage of reports responded to by Peacebuilding structures</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 50% capture; 25% response</p>	Monitoring CSO's reports, EWERS data outputs	<p>6 months: ICT component of EWERS complete</p> <p>12 months: PB structures linked and sensitized to EWERS system</p>

	<p>Output 1.1 Establishment of state-level agency/commission/structure to drive gender-sensitive peacebuilding agenda</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>Mapping and review of State Agencies / Commission / structures, CSOs engaged in peace and security, and existing EWERS available in the states and make practical recommendations</p> <p>Advocacy and provision of technical support to establish an Agency / Commission / structure</p> <p>Inter-state exchange for learning and sharing of good practices</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.1 Number of agreements with state governors' offices on supporting the establishment of agency/commission/structure</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 3 agreements</p>	<p>Signed agreements, law/or decree establishing the agency, public statements by state officials, press releases</p>	<p>6 months: 1 signed agreement for each state 12 months: n/a activity completed</p>
	<p>Output 1.2 State peacebuilding Agency / Commission / structure supported to drive gender-sensitive response to farmers-herders crisis</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>Support through facilitating coordination meetings with ministries, departments, CSOs/CBOs, traditional and religious institutions, and women and youth networks to promote coordination around peace</p> <p>Targeted support to peacebuilding Agency / Commission / structure in operationalizing relevant elements of UNSCR 1325</p> <p>Support to CSOs to engage in community monitoring activities on farmers-herders crisis and reporting to peacebuilding Agency / Commission / structure</p> <p>Targeted support to enable early response from Agency / Commission / structure based on early warning signs to promote gender-sensitive dialogue and mediation as a first step to resolving a crisis</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.1 Number of institutions supported to drive gender sensitive response</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 15 (at least 5 per state)</p>	<p>Perception survey by monitoring CSOs, meeting/workshop minutes, letters of appreciation, interim monitoring reports provided to project partners and PB structures</p>	<p>6 months: key institutions needing support identified 12 months: 50% of identified institutions have received needed support</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2.2 Number of mediation/dialogues led by peacebuilding structure</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 5 documented dialogue interventions</p>	<p>Dialogue records, local level agreements</p>	<p>6 months: dialogue training protocol for PB structures developed 12 months: dialogue sensitization and support to PB structures initiated</p>

	<p>Output 1.3 Gender-sensitive early warning and early response capacity developed, supported and improved</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>Develop and implement ICT-based EWERS</p> <p>Capacity building and system strengthening to the EWER institutions in target states</p> <p>Advocacy at national and state levels with top government officials and security agencies to enhance effective response to conflict early warnings</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.3.1 Number of functional EWERS established</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 3 (1 EWERS per state receives warnings, processes data and communicates threat to appropriate offices to initiate response)</p>	<p>Procurement report of completion of EWERS, EWERS database for logged warnings, threats transmitted, and responses initiated</p>	<p>6 months: ICT component of EWERS complete 12 months: EWERS generating reports and linked to PB structures</p>
	<p>Output 1.4 Constructive dialogue promoted through inter-ethnic and inter-religious exchanges</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>Support one CSO to build capacity and raise awareness with traditional rulers and religious leaders on peaceful coexistence, strengthening local level conflict prevention mechanisms, convening town hall meetings, and providing safe spaces for dialogue to take place.</p> <p>Consultative meetings with stakeholders on legislation around open grazing</p> <p>Sensitization and awareness raising activities amongst pastoralists, crop farmers, and members of the public on the cost of conflict and economic benefits of peaceful coexistence</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.4.1 Number of verifiable peacebuilding activities achieved</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 30</p>	<p>CSO monthly assessments document progress</p>	<p>6 months: CSO baseline completed and activities agreed 12 months: 50% of activities delivered</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 1.4.2 Number of relevant state institutions provided with validated outputs from open grazing consultations</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 4 (at least 2 institutions in 2 states)</p>	<p>Meeting declarations, Response letters from State institutions</p>	<p>6 months: Consultation protocol agreed with relevant state agencies 12 months: Initial round of consultations completed in 3 states</p>
<p>Outcome 2: Strengthening Economic Interdependence between farmers and herders</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 2 a. No of new co-operative initiatives between farmers and herders demonstrating mutually beneficial economic interdependence.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 3 instances of new cooperation</p>	<p>Project report with pictures</p>	<p>6 months: Sensitization of planned assessments, pilots and project activities with key institutions, associations and private sector initiated 12 months: high level recommendations brief</p>

				prepared to underpin advocacy
		Outcome Indicator 2 b. No of target States that adopt concepts of pasture and alternative fodder system for scale-up Baseline: 0 Target: 2	Project report Letters from State and community leaders	6 months: Discussions on project livelihoods and economic project interventions held with relevant state agencies 12 months: Key recommendations arising from surveys, pilots and projects activity provided to relevant state agencies and workshops/roundtables planned
		Outcome Indicator 2 c. No of people benefiting from new market opportunities in project areas Baseline: 0 Target: 485 direct beneficiaries and at least 50000 indirect beneficiaries (70% youth, 50% women)	Project report Beneficiaries disaggregated by farmer-herder-male-female-youth	6 months: M&E baseline clearly identifies project beneficiaries and potential target groups 12 months: Project pilots and trainings 50% completed
	Output 2.1 Improved land, fodder/feedstock and water management to reduce competition over natural resources List of activities under this Output: Surveying of 5,000 Ha for one state in support of the National Livestock Development Plan Pilot pasture development through land preparation, provision of water harvesting structures, pasture production, processing and conservation Assessment of alternative fodder/feedstock opportunities and information disseminated to both farmers and herders Training of 60 Agricultural extensions officers on alternative feedstocks and value chains	Output Indicator 2.1.1 Survey reports provided to relevant State institutions and validated Baseline: 0 Target: 1	State survey reports	6 months: survey protocol designed, field experts hired 12 months: draft survey reports available
		Output Indicator 2.1.2 No of farmers and herders (disaggregated by gender and age) informed about alternative fodder/feedstock opportunities Baseline: 0 Target:	CSO assessment in 3 states, meeting minutes, logbooks of 60 extension workers trained (50% women) and deployed with assessment report information	6 months: Agreements with Agriculture Dept on content and timing of trainings 12 months: 100% of trainings completed, extension outreach initiated

	<p>Output 2.2 Livelihood opportunities at agricultural/pastoral interface improved to incentivize farmer herder co-operation</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>Profile farmers, pastoralists, CBOs, vocational training centers, women and youths, and conduct an assessment on livelihood opportunities</p> <p>Supporting vocational training for farmers, herders, women, youth and victims of conflict</p> <p>Providing startup kits for graduates of vocational training programmes</p> <p>Strengthen existing cooperative platforms & CBOs through provision of knowledge products, advisory services and sensitization</p> <p>Conduct capacity building for 300 conflict affected people on value chain development around livestock production and markets</p> <p>Convene high-level meetings between private sector and state to raise awareness of fodder and feedstocks value chain and investment opportunities</p> <p>Provide catalytic support to alternative fodder production</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.2.1 No. of persons trained on value chain development around livestock production and markets</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 300 disaggregated by men/women/youth and age</p>	<p>Training report on value chain development around livestock production and markets</p>	<p>6 months: Target states and beneficiaries identified and trainings planned 12 months: Trainings 50% completed</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.2 No of Platforms and CBOs reached with knowledge products, advisory services and sensitization activities</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: at least 6 (2 per state)</p>	<p>Project report with pictures</p> <p>Letters from co-operative platforms & CBOs acknowledging material and support received</p>	<p>6 months: Draft profiling report completed 12 months: at least 1 CBO/Platform engaged in each state</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.3 No. of men/women/youths supported by vocational training</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 125</p>	<p>Training report</p>	<p>6 months: Training package devised, training planned 12 months: vocational training 50% completed</p>
<p>Outcome 3: Enhanced accountability promotes increased effectiveness of response to the farmers-herders crisis</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 3 a. Number of states with a systematic monitoring of HR abuses</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 1</p>	<p>Reports from target CSOs, Reports from NCHR</p>	<p>6 months: NGO/CSO partner in one state contracted and trained on reporting 12 months: Regular reporting achieved</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 3 b. Percentage increase in awareness of SEA and SGBV in project area</p> <p>Baseline: low awareness Target: 50% of surveyed population state being aware of SEA/SGBV</p>	<p>Perception survey reports</p>	<p>6 months: Gender sensitization activities planned and agreed with security sector 12 months: Capacity building activities 50% complete</p>

		Outcome Indicator 3 c. Degree of improvement in HR responsiveness of military and security apparatus Baseline: zero/low response Target: 30% improvement	Perception survey reports	6 months: HR sensitization activities planned and agreed with security sector 12 months: Documented regular engagements with security outfit - 50% complete
	Output 3.1 Capacity of monitoring, investigation and follow up on human rights offences enhanced List of activities under this Output: Pilot human rights monitoring and reporting mechanism through National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)/NGO/CSO partnership in one state Support to NHRC in convening CSOs, CBOs involved in human rights monitoring in each state Capacity building and awareness raising on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and sexual and gender-based (SGBV) violence	Output Indicator 3.1.1 No and quality of reports referencing documented HR abuses Baseline: irregular reports of poor quality Target: regular reporting that meets minimum standards	Trend analysis	6 months: CSO identified and active in pilot area 12 months: CSO submitting monthly reports
		Output Indicator 3.1.2 Percentage of reported HR abuses and violations that are investigated Baseline: low Target: 50% improvement	Trend analysis	6 months: Assessment of pre-project HR reporting complete 12 months: Trend analysis shows improvement
	Output 3.2 Increased civil-military/security agencies cooperation and dialogue List of activities under this Output: Capacity building and sensitization of security agencies on codes of conduct and rules of engagement Advocacy to deploy human rights desk of Nigerian Army alongside any military deployment in the three states Support local level platforms for dialogue and exchange with security agencies and informal security actors (i.e. vigilante groups)	Output Indicator 3.2.1 No of workshops and dialogue platforms supporting behavioral changes Baseline: 0 Target: 3	Workshop statement/attendance sheets, Nigerian Army HR desk deployment reports	6 months: Workshops/platforms planned and initial consultations with HR desk of Nigerian Army held 12 months: Agreement on minimum standards achieved with security agencies
Outcome 4: Improved understanding of the crisis encourages evidence-based		Outcome Indicator 4 a. Number of initiatives informed by Project-generated information and advocacy on farmers-herders crisis	CSO monitoring reports, organization's letters of request, declarations arising	6 months: n/a 12 months: 2 initiatives proposed

advocacy, targeted investments and innovative solutions		Baseline: 0 Target: 5 (at least 2 target women/youth)	from meeting, project documents	
		Outcome Indicator 4 b. Number of references in national and state media to Project-generated information and analysis on farmers-herders crisis Baseline: 0 Target: 12	Monitoring national and state media	6 months: Media monitoring system in place 12 months: Interim impact analysis complete
		Outcome Indicator 4 c. Total value of additional funds leveraged to address farmer herder conflict Baseline: 0 Target: \$5 million (at least \$1 million targets women/youth)	Project documents, requests for information, donor agreements, state/federal commitments	6 months: n/a 12 months: at least \$1 million leveraged
	Output 4.1 Information Management and Analysis Unit provides reliable and credible information on farmers-herders crisis List of activities under this Output: Information management Protocol developed to ensure gender and youth dis-aggregated data is gathered to enable project gender and youth targeted interventions and broader advocacy Information gathered under the project and through partners are collated and analyzed GIS-mapping capabilities enable spatial plotting of attacks to inform trends in the crisis Production of analytical briefs and updates on the crisis in the three states help provide partners with a nuanced and well-informed understanding of the crisis	Output Indicator 4.1.1 Number of verified and objective information products based on the project's sources of information Baseline: 0 Target: 3 Reports, 9 updates and 12 infographics produced (with gender and youth dis-aggregated data and analyses)	Database, GIS system, regular reporting from field partners, access to reports, updates and infographics	6 months: GIS and media officer hired, software procured, initial update and infographics on project baseline data produced 12 months: 1 report, 3 updates and 6 infographics produced

	<p>Output 4.2 Objective and verified information on the crisis is made publicly available</p> <p>List of activities under this Output:</p> <p>Publishing outputs on online repositories and websites for wide distribution and sharing with the public</p> <p>Engagement with State Ministries of Information help ensure that state-level media houses are made aware of the information and analysis generated</p> <p>Social media platforms disseminate reports, briefs and infographics widely</p>	<p>Output Indicator 4.2.1 Number of Reports, briefs and infographics that reach a wide audience</p> <p>Baseline: 0 reached, 0 likes, 0 shares/retweets Target: 100,000 reached, 1,000 likes, 1,000 shares/retweets</p>	<p>Social media analytics, press releases and public announcements by State Ministries of Information; State Ministry websites</p>	<p>6 months: n/a 12 months: Creation of social media pages, membership in key social media forums, MoUs signed with SMols on sharing of information</p>
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Annex C: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
1. Have all implementing partners been identified?	Yes		Implementing partners have been identified. A tendering process will be embarked upon to select which partners will do the community monitoring functions. Additional consultations with federal, state and community-level stakeholders have been built into the early phases of the project to ensure a participatory approach.
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise?	Yes		Terms of Reference for some key staff are drafted. Additional TORs are being produced to ensure that all positions can quickly be filled and the project can get set up early on in the implementation phase.
3. Have project sites been identified?	Yes		Location of project has been agreed upon in meetings with state liaison officers. Further refinement of this will be undertaken with communities on ground at the onset of the project as part of the profiling and assessment activities foreseen.

4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence the project?	Yes		Federal and State authorities have been briefed and consulted in the development of the project. Further consultations and profiling activities planned for the beginning of the project will help further identify specific work plans and approaches in the different contexts.
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done?	Yes		Ongoing implementation from work in Benue State as well as support to the Federal process of developing the National Livestock Transformation Plan have helped inform the design of this project document.
6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified?		No	The criteria will need to be extensively consulted at the grassroots level to ensure that they reflect the differences between communities. To ensure a participatory and community-owned process, these criteria will need to be defined over the course of several engagements with local level stakeholders planned at the onset of project implementation.
7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	Yes		States have been consulted on the areas where the project will focus its activities and are in

			agreement. At the onset of project implementation, mission to the selected areas will further refine and formalize these agreements.
8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	Yes		All four recipient organizations have been involved in the development of the project document.
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?		N/A	